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Introduction

Extremist movements are on the rise throughout the West, specifically in Europe. There is plenty
of literature discussing the behavior of the parties at the head of these movements, however, there
is not so great an emphasis on studying the individual voter, particularly not in post-communist
systems. It is easy to get lost staring at the big picture and ultimately lose track of the individual
people and their circumstances which ultimately fuel these movements. The fact that these parties
are consistently elected into parliaments needs to be addressed in greater detail than it currently is.
This paper, while large scale, will try to create a picture of the average extremist voter, specifically
keying on the factors of age and region. There is research showing that far-right voters tend to be
older, and that they exist more prevalently in post-communist countries (Inglehart, 2018).
However, I will show that this relationship is consistent with far-left movements as well as with
far-right movements. I will also analyze how this dynamic and other demographic factors affect
extremism in both Western and Post-Communist countries. Ultimately, I will show that existing
theories do not sufficiently explain the generational gap and propose some alternatives.

Literature Review

Extremist voting is a subject on which scholars are widely divided, as differences even on the
definition of extremism consistently serve as impediments to the formation of a cohesive theory.
Beyond this, scholars disagree about whether the primary cause for the rise in the extreme right
has to do with voter psychology, institutions, party behavior, or any number of other factors. The
only certainty in the field is that extremism is a Western phenomenon, and is not specific to just

the US or Europe (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). To address these divisions, I will first establish a
working definition for this paper; then I will outline the theory behind different schools of thought.

Definitions

Extremism presents itself with specific pieces of rhetoric; the far left is characterized by words
like “communism,” “state-control,” “economic equality,” and so on, while the far right is seen as
“populist,” “nationalist,” “racist,” and “fascist.” Attempts to encapsulate these ideas in a single
definition utilize one of two strategic frameworks: broad and narrow. Broad definitions attempt
to address the fluidity of extremist ideology, though some are averse to them because they may
mistakenly include parties closer to the center of the spectrum because they are anti-immigrant or
position themselves against the current establishment (Adams, et al., 2006). For example,
Minkenberg (2013) considers the far-right to be an ideology which focuses on attaining the
homogeneity of a nation, incorporating elements of populism and nationalism, and runs counter to
liberal democratic values. However, as he admits, this allows for an “‘extremism of the center’”
which may be too inclusive for other scholars who would point to examples like the Republican
party in the United States and the Conservative party in the United Kingdom which fit his
definition, but are definitely not extremist. In order to account for this, a definition should include
the fact that far-right parties are anti-democratic—either explicitly so by adopting a fascist stance,
or implicitly by standing on a platform which is unattainable by democratic means. Measure this
would be to gauge how these policies would affect “effective democracy,” which refers to the
integrity of a system’s democratic institutions, rather than the simple on-paper existence of these

institutions (Inglehart, pg. 118).

Thus, any extremist party must have viewpoints that are

antithetical to the existence of an effective democracy.

Nonetheless, a definition which attempts to be too specific can run the risk of excluding parties on
the fringes which should be included in a complete analysis of the far-right. Most narrow
categorizations expect parties to fall in line with the typical anti-immigrant rhetoric which
characterizes many of the far-right movements in the West; however, this tenant of radicalism is
not sufficient in categorizing all of the extremist movements (Mosca, 2014). Radicalism is an
umbrella covering a multitude of fluid ideologies, so a working definition needs to be flexible
enough to account for them. Harrison (2011) propose four pillars of the far-right—xenophobia,
populism, reactionary rhetoric, and repressive policies (Harrison, pg. 168). This method of
categorization bridges the gap between frameworks, as it is specific enough that it excludes centrist
parties, but fluid enough to encapsulate the relative nature of extremist ideology.

While

xenophobia can refer to the anti-immigrant rhetoric popular amongst the far-right, it works better
to characterize the sentiment behind these platforms which is inherent to other parties that are not
so militantly anti-immigrant. Populist and reactionary elements work hand-in-hand to incorporate
burgeoning parties and movements which have to respond quickly on behalf of a fickle and upset
constituency. The last pillar is key here, because one of the most characterizing traits (and most
dangerous, some would say) of far-right movements is their disdain for the democratic process;
extremists may present their ideologies in different fashions, keying on different specific issues,
but they always run counter to the democratic process in some way.

The far-left is far less complex to define due to the fact that most far-left parties are explicitly
communist or even left-over from the Soviet Era, so they have an identifiable history. Those which
are not explicitly communist will stand on a platform which is opposed to privatization and which
supports equality to an extreme—often emphasizing economic equality. Typically, these parties
will call themselves “socialist,” even though the extremism in their ideology tends to border on
communism, which means that on the traditional left-right scale, they occupy the farthest left end.
However, far-left parties do fit neatly on the spectrum (March & Mudde, 2005). They are not to
be confused with Green parties, Pirate parties, or other single-interest parties that might sit on the
extreme left of the ideological scale, but whose defining features do not fall on the spectrum—
such as environmental conservation or internet freedom (Spoon, 2014). Similar to the extreme
right, though, far-left parties will have anti-democratic values, believing in the rule of the state
over the rule of the people. This means that any extremist party classified in this paper will have
some sort of anti-democratic stance, however the right and the left will be differentiated by
ideological positioning, with the left side consisting of anti-capitalist and anti-privatization stances
and the right side consisting of xenophobic and nationalist sentiments.

Institutionalists

After establishing what an extremist party looks like, the next, more pressing question is why are
they becoming so popular? An institutional view might point to the ideological jockeying between
large and small parties, where small extremist parties are responding to constituencies which large
parties cannot reach due to ideological restraints (Meguid, 2008; Spoon, 2014). On the other hand,

this rise in extremism could be the result of post-materialism within constituencies, where voters
are responding to cultural issues and not economic issues (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Norris,
2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Neto, 1997). Even still, there is a distinct difference between
extremism in post-communist countries and in Western countries—both in its inception and its
behavior (Innes, 2002; Ishiyama, 1995; Minkenberg, 2014). The post-communist element is an
important one, as the rise in extremism in Eastern Europe is much more potent than in the West,
which is remarkable because scholars at the turn of the century thought that radicalism could only
be found in Western democracies—the East was not yet far enough removed from communism to
even form non-mainstream parties (Pop-Eleches, 2010).

Nonetheless, non-mainstream and

extremist parties began popping up, and after 2010, they had real power and influence. Innes
(2002) theorizes that this is because it took three generations of elections for post-communist
countries to become comfortable voting for non-mainstream parties. This is an institutional theory
which considers parties to be the main actors—setting up big-tent operations to feel out the
sentiments of an unfamiliar constituency, then evolving with each election until they knew their
constituencies well enough to splinter into smaller, narrower parties. This, along with the PopEleches (2010) theory about protest voting explain why extremist parties came about in the 2000’s,
but they do not explain why they have become so popular.

Voter Behavior

The problem with this institutionalist view is that it does not address the complex psychology of
voter behavior—largely because it typically relies on election data. Voting data is not necessarily

the best measure of extremist support. Even though election results are a good indicator of a
party’s success—they do not necessarily relate to the support these parties command (Harrison,
2011). Election results alone do not account for anomalies like protest voting (which can create
the illusion of support) or voters’ hesitancy to vote for a non-competitive party (which can make
a party seem unpopular) (Pop-Eleches, 2010). This is detrimental to understanding extremist
parties’ long-term success because successful parties can be the result of a constituency’s
displeasure with the established party rather than their satisfaction with the platform of an
extremist party. In the same way, a constituency may identify with the platform of an extremist
party, but end up casting votes for mainstream parties because they are so prominent that potential
extremist voters fear casting a vote for a losing party. Survey data is unreliable still—as was made
abundantly clear in the 2016 US Presidential election—because extremist voters may not reliably
report their voting intentions because they are embarrassed to admit them (Inglehart & Norris,
2016).

Generational Effects

Nonetheless, when looking at extremist party success, the foundational work is Inglehart (1977),
which theorizes the effect of post-materialism on voters’ priorities and behaviors. People who
grow up in a generation which faces insecurity (whether economic or foreign) will tend to vote
based on those interests, resulting in mainstream party success; whereas people who grow up
during a time of security will vote based on cultural rather than economic values, and nonmainstream parties will find more success. This would explain why non-mainstream parties rose

in popularity during the Baby-Boomer era, since both Europe and the United States were
prospering after the end of World War II. However, the contemporary phenomenon is antithetical
to this idea of a cultural revolution, considering that countries in the West have been stable and
secure for decades, yet extremist party success has come from tapping into the insecurities of
different constituencies. Inglehart (2018) theorizes that this is a sort of cultural revolution in
reverse, where the concept of security has changed within society so that, even though these people
are as secure as they have ever been, they feel threatened, and thus they are voting in response to
such contemporary insecurities as rising economic disparity and the influx of immigrants.
However, Inglehart’s analysis is inconsistent with contemporary voting patterns, and falls short
for two reasons.

The first problem with Inglehart’s new theory is that, though extremist parties are using economic
issues in their platforms (employment being threatened by immigrants), much of their support
comes from older voters—people who are more likely to be retired, and thus not affected by any
income disparity or employment (Inglehart, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Inglehart & Norris
2017). This means that they have less of a reason to feel insecure, since they are not making a
wage, and are less likely to buy into an extremist platform, since they are less concerned about
employment. Inglehart’s analysis is inconsistent here—the prime demographic for extremist
support should not be affected by the new sense of insecurity he proposes, and they are less likely
to actually relate to the parties they support. Essentially, the votes for the far-right are coming
from the people who are the most economically secure (retired, pensioned) and who are the least
likely to be concerned with employment.

The second deficiency in Inglehart’s analysis is that it does not demonstrate the differences in farright support between Post-Communist Europe and Western Europe. Post-Communism is, in and
of itself, a factor in political behavior, and should be heavily considered in any analysis of party
politics in Europe (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009; Mudde, 2005). As shown in Innes (2002) and
Pop-Eleches (2010), the development of Eastern European countries into functioning democracies
has had a unique affect on the dynamics of the non-mainstream and extremist parties there. In
order to perform a complete analysis of extremist party support, there must be an emphasis on the
unique histories of these countries which have resulted in radically different voter dynamics
(Kostelecký, 2002; Vachudova, 2008). The far-left has all but died out in the West—the fall of
the Soviet Union showed that communism was not a viable option—however it still persists in the
East, and this largely goes unexplained (March & Mudde, 2005; Minkenberg, 2013). These
countries saw communism fail first-hand, so it makes little sense that places like the Czech
Republic can have such a party taking up 15% of the seats in Parliament. Much of the reason for
the lack of scholarship on this specific area may be due to the far-right generating much more of
an impact, but both extremes play a role in modern politics, and the far-left is explainable, which
leads me to my hypotheses which are as follows:
H1: In both East and West Europe, those supporting far-right and far-left parties (either through
voting or affiliation) tend to be older than other voters, thus signifying a generational gap between
older and younger voters.
H2: Younger voters in both the East and West are less likely to support the extremes due to this
generational gap.
H3: People in Post-Communist countries are more likely to support either extreme than people in
Western countries.

Based on Inglehart’s theory, I do not expect an extremist split across generations, where one
generation is more predisposed to supporting the far-right and the other the far-left. Both extremes
will have similar if not identical patterns of support between the generations. That said, the second
and third hypotheses are intended to show the contradictions between Inglehart and the data.
Under his framework, one would expect the generational effects to be reversed, at least in the older
generation, when it comes to Post-Communist countries, however this is not what is actually
happening. This paper will show the discrepancies between the established literature and current
trends in support and attempt to fill the gap by positing some alternatives using the data and
methods described below.

Data and Methods

The most encompassing data set I have found is the European Social Survey, which includes
questions about which party each respondent voted for, which party they feel closest to, and other
very specific demographic questions. From this data, I pulled out the responses from The Czech
Republic, Hungary, The Netherlands, and Norway; then I narrowed in on their answers to
questions about voting behavior, party preference, education, gender, and age. Ideally, I would
look at every European country, but, due to the limitations of this project, I will look at these four
countries as a representation of the European situation. The survey was last conducted in 2014, so
it only includes the 2013 elections in the Czech Republic, the 2014 elections in Hungary, the 2012
elections in The Netherlands, and the 2013 elections in Norway. Nonetheless, these marked some
of the first breakthroughs for far-right parties in parliamentary elections.

Countries

The Czech Republic and Hungary are both Post-Communist countries with far-left and far-right
parties in parliament, however the Czech communist party is more popular than its far-right party,
and the far-right party Fidesz in Hungary is far more popular than the communist party there.
Representing the West, The Netherlands and Norway both have active far-left and far-right parties,
with far-right parties on the rise—as is the case with most Western European countries. This
makes the dataset representative of a few facets of the European political dynamic.
Geographically, it represents both East and West Europe, without focusing too much on one
region. The extremist parties on both the right and the left in all four countries also have varying
levels of success. The Czech Republic represents the old-guard communist parties whose success
relies on older voters held over from their time in the Soviet Union. Hungary represents countries
whose experiences under the Soviet Union were much more oppressive, so there is not much of a
far-left, but have thriving far-right parties. The Netherlands and Norway both have active far-left
and far-right parties, but, as is the case with all Western European countries, the far-right parties
have seen more success than the far-left.

Parties
The parties classified as ‘extremist’ in this study are consistent with the definition outlined
above—they have platforms which run counter to effective democracy, far-right parties have

xenophobic tendencies, and far-left parties are anti-privatization. Figure 1.1 is a table showing all
of these extremist parties and whether they are far-left or far right.
Country
CZE
CZE
HUN
HUN
HUN
NED
NED
NED
NOR
NOR

Party
KSCM
UPD
Fidesz
Jobbik
MMP
PVV
SP
SGP
FrP
R

Classification
Far-Left
Far-Right
Far-Right
Far-Right
Far-Left
Far-Right
Far-Left
Far-Right
Far-Right
Far-Left

Figure 1.1 – Party Classifications
Most of these parties are very obviously far-left or far-right, but for those which are not, I will now
offer a defense of their classifications. The UPD in The Czech Republic was not explicitly a farright party at the time, however a large faction of the party eventually broke off to become the
SPD, which is a neo-fascist, anti-immigrant party. While this is not the best example of a far-right
party, I am using support for it as a barometer for the initial support for the far-right in the Czech
Republic. Fidesz has gone through a few different iterations since its inception as an anti-soviet,
pro-democratic party in the 1990’s, led by revolutionary Viktor Orbàn. Ironically, once Orbàn
took up the helm again, the party turned fascist with a hardline anti-immigrant stance and an intent
to gain control of the courts in order to ensure the passage of their far-right ideology. This choice
is controversial only because the party was in government with a moderate conservative party, but
their own ideology falls in line with the definition I am using, and their current single-party
government is uninhibitedly extreme. Lastly, there are two Dutch parties which lie on the fringes
of my definitions—the Socialist Party and SGP—one far-left and one far-right. The Socialist Party
considers itself socialist rather than communist, however, in practice, their ideology is far-left.
They are fervently anti-privatization and pro-equality to a point that effective democracy could not

satisfy their agenda. While this is not communism, it fits with the definition of left-wing
extremism. The SGP is classified as far-right because, while not explicitly xenophobic, its stance
on feminism, the death penalty, and religion are not healthy to an effective democracy. In
proposing organic suffrage over universal suffrage, they are repressive and by proposing to
reinstate the death penalty they show support for a policy that, throughout Europe, has been widely
considered undemocratic.

Overall, the goal in mind when including some of these parties on the fringes of the definition is
to find other ways to target extremist voters in these systems. The absence of an extremist party
does not equate to an absence of extremist voters in a system. Though a party may not intend to
attract extremist voters, they still serve as a measure for extremist party support and help to indicate
where extremist voters are, what they look like, and how they behave.

Methods

In the next section I will use linear regression analysis to create models for the Eastern and Western
countries in this study. While a logistical model would probably be a better fit, due to the
limitations of my resources and the restrictions on this paper, the linear model will do nicely to
provide an idea for which demographic factors affect voter behavior and to test my hypotheses.
For the regressions, I coded people aged 50 and over into a dummy variable and people aged 35
and younger into a different dummy variable (“Old” and “Young” respectively). Gender, for this
survey data, is coded 1 for male and 2 for female, which means that a positive coefficient would

indicate female support, while a negative coefficient indicates male support. The results of these
regressions are discussed below.
Results
Western Countries
The first regression results come from the data for Dutch and Norwegian respondents, and show
that there are multiple highly-significant results throughout the independent variables that I tested.
Figures 2.1, 2.3, and 2.5 show that age is a definite factor in voting for the far-right and far-left,
where old age shows that a person is much more likely to vote for the far-right and the far-left.
And while the findings for the young variable in Figure 2.3 are not statistically significant, the
coefficient is still negative, which falls in line with the findings in Figures 2.1 and 2.3, which show
that younger voters in these countries are far less likely to support far-right and extremist parties.
In Figures 2.2, 2.4, and 2.6, where I tested party identification rather than votes, my findings were
consistent with the voter models, showing that old age is a positive effect on extremist party
support while youth has a negative effect. It is also interesting that education has no affect on
voting behavior or extremist support, unlike what Inglehart (2018) found. This could be due to
how the variable was coded—since the question asked for the respondent’s highest level of
education, which does not regard the number of years the individual spent in school, and this could
also translate awkwardly across countries.

Nonetheless, the statistical significance of the

coefficient would suggest that education, in fact, does not have an effect on extremist voting in the
West. Moreover, the regression analysis on the post-communist countries and all the countries
together show the same result—that one’s level of education has no effect on extremist tendencies.
It is also interesting that the results are consistent between voting and identifying, which means
that extremists in this survey do not feel deterred from voting for the parties they support. This

shows that party identity is a good measure of support because it not only shows the possibility
that someone will vote, but an actual willingness to vote.
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Figure 2.2 West Far-Right Identification
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Figure 2.3 West Far-Left Voters
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Figure 2.4 West Far-Left Identification

.030

Std.
Error
.023

.190

.033

.002

.000

.004
-.066
.045
.000

.009
.013
.012
.000

.651
.000
.000
.000

B
Constant
Left/Right
Ideology
Gender
35 and under
50 and older
Education

Sig

Adjusted R Squared=.054; N=3226

Figure 2.5 West Extremist Party Voters
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Figure 2.6 West Extremist Party Identification
With respect to my hypotheses, the results show that the older generation in Western Europe has
a greater propensity to support extremist parties than the other generations, and younger
generations are actually more averse to extremism. This supports Inglehart’s contention that the
cultural revolution is happening in reverse. Such a generational disparity in support for the left

and right could be a sign that cultural values have changed from post-materialist to materialist.
This is significant in Western Europe because the people in the younger generation have
experienced everything from the triumph of western values over communism as they caused the
fall of the Soviet Union to the rise of terrorism with such events as the attack on the World Trade
Center in the United States. It could be that younger people have grown up in an environment of
insecurity and thus are more ardently moderate than the older generation, which is using extremism
to channel their post-materialist values.

The Post-Communist Variable

Extremist support in the West is consistent with post-materialism, but with the vastly different
history of Eastern Europe, one would expect voting behavior to differ between the East and the
West. This difference is shown in Figure 2.7, which shows regression analysis over all four
countries in the study using a post-communist variable.
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Figure 2.7 European Extremist Identification

This table shows that people in post-communist countries are more likely to support extremist
parties than those in Western countries. Though this is consistent with other research in the field,
it is odd considering these countries already had direct experience with extremist governments.

Time spent in the Soviet Union would likely deter people from voting for far-left parties on the
basis of ideology, and from far-right parties on the basis of authoritarianism. It does not make
sense that countries which have such recent experience with an extremist regime and which were
so eager to democratize in the 1990’s would so suddenly develop extremist tendencies.

However, this may be explained by generational gaps. It is conceivable that, unlike in the West,
the Eastern wave of extremism is driven by a younger generation with little-to-no recollection of
life under a communist regime. This would also be consistent with the post-materialist theory, as
the older generation, growing up in an economically stricken and repressive communist society
would be more likely to support moderate parties, while the younger generation, knowing only
new-found economic success and freedom, would be more likely to vote extremist on cultural
grounds.

Post-Communist Countries

Upon further examination, it looks as though the data does not support that theory. As shown in
the tables below, the generational variables are the same as in the West, where older generations
are supporting extremist parties while younger generations are averse to supporting extremism.
Generationally speaking, this is inconsistent with the established theory. People over fifty grew
up under a failing communist regime riddled with economic strife and facing multiple revolutions,
so, under Inglehart’s theory, these people would be most likely to vote for moderate, prodemocratic parties. However, as my analysis indicates, exactly the opposite is happening, which
means that either the account of life during those times was wildly different from the reality, or

Inglehart’s theory does not hold up for post-communist countries.

Because this theory is

predicated on the circumstances of the developmental period for each generation, then generations
which grew up under vastly different circumstances should behave vastly differently. Nonetheless,
the generation which spent its formative years in a communist system and then went through a
revolution is voting exactly the same as a generation which grew up in a thriving capitalist society.
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Figure 2.8 East Far-Left Identification
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Figure 2.9 East Far-Right Identification
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Figure 2.10 East Extremist Identification

Perhaps, then, the motivating factor has little, if anything, to do with how each generation spent
its younger years, but instead, everything to do with the circumstances of the present. It would
make sense that older people who are either retired or on the verge of retirement, regardless of the
environment of their younger years, would have less of an interest in economic issues than younger
people beginning their careers. This is especially true when the job market is over-saturated and
underpaying. It is the same sentiment that is seen in a corporate setting where interns and newhires scramble to impress their bosses and to improve the company when, all the while, the senior
employees, only a couple years from retirement, care far more about the temperature of their office
or the quality of the coffee than the future of the company.

In light of this, I contend that Inglehart’s theory overcomplicates the reality of the situation. While
economic security certainly plays a part in generational voting behavior, it is the current state of
economic security which matters most. Someone who is facing a fixed-income for the rest of her
non-working life is bound to have a different perspective of the economy than someone at the
bottom, fighting for job-security from year to year. It seems that Occam’s Razor favors this
explanation, and with the data supporting it, it looks as though generational voting gaps are merely
the product of age difference rather than a difference in upbringing.

Sources of Error

This analysis would be much more formidable if it included data from the most recent elections
(which will be available from the ESS in 2019), however, as a means to analyze the first big
breakthrough of extremist parties, it works quite well. Of course, it would also help to include all

the European countries rather than just these four, however, as mentioned above, the scope of this
project is limited by the timeframe and requirements of the class. Similarly, the more rudimentary
methods used to analyze the data due to a lack of resources and limitations on the paper could
explain the low R-Squared values. I plan to expand the scope and further legitimize this study by
using more sophisticated analytical methods in the future.

Conclusion

Inglehart’s theory from 1977 has dominated the thoughts on voting behavior since its inception,
and for good reason. It perfectly explained the rise of non-mainstream parties in the West after
World War II, but given the developments since then—the fall of the Soviet Union, the global
economic shake-up, rises in terrorism and immigration, etc.—the theory has proven to need some
reworking. His recent update on the theory with Norris tries to account for this unprecedented
shift toward extremist parties, however, in trying to construct an image of the average extremist
voter, they focus too much on how people grew up, and seem to ignore how they are living. The
analysis I performed above shows that there is not the vast disparity between the East and West
which one would anticipate using only the existing theories about generational support trends. It
is inarguable that post-materialism plays a huge role in Western politics, but it may very well do
something entirely different than what scholars consider it to do. What is clear from the data and
my analysis is that generations in the East and West are showing the same patterns of support
despite the fact that it would make sense for then to behave entirely differently.

This initial study, while modest, works to point out some of the flaws in the established literature.
In order to build on this theory, there needs to be more case-study research in order to show why
these movements have become so popular with people who should not be supporting them. For
example, half of Germany experienced Soviet rule, and now it exists with the rest of Germany
under the same government. If the results from this study are consistent there, then the generational
schism they present could be better explained. However, if this field is to understand the entirety
of these movements, then survey data and voting records will not suffice. Only by expanding the
scope of this study and increasing its depth with extremism become more understandable in its
current context.
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